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Income distribution 
and poverty through crisis
and adjustment
Oscar Altimir
This article analyses the costs in terms of income distribution of 
the crisis and adjustments of the 1980s, as well as the effects of the 
subsequent recovery and resumption of sustained growth patterns. This 
analysis is based on comparable pairs of estimates of income distribution 
and poverty prepared by eclac for the ten largest and predominantly 
urban countries of the region. The method of analysis consists, on the one 
hand, of comparing the changes in distribution and in the macroeconomic 
and labour market variables during similar macroeconomic phases in the 
course of the adjustment process in different countries and, on the other 
hand, of comparing the income distribution situations in each country 
before and after the adjustment. It is concluded that although economic 
recovery and the reduction of inflation are relieving poverty situations, 
medium-term growth without an improvement in income distribution will 
cause the process of reducing poverty to be excessively prolonged, and 
there are grounds for believing that the new form of operation and the 
new rules followed by public policy in these economies may involve still 
greater inequalities as regards income distribution.
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Most Latin American countries are painfully 
recovering from the protracted crisis they suffered 
during the 1980s and from the traumatic adjustments 
they had to undergo in order to extricate themselves 
from it and to lay the bases for a new phase of 
sustained growth.
The net transfer of resources to the region, which 
before the crisis represented more than 2% of its gdp, 
suddenly became negative. Between 1982 and 1989, 
the Latin American countries’ net export of capital 
was equivalent to almost 4% of their aggregate gdp. 
The turnaround in the net transfer of resources was 
thus tantamount to a permanent pressure of 6% on 
domestic resources during this period.
After the external adjustment and recession that 
brought the regional per capita product down by 
10% between 1980 and 1983, most Latin American 
economies wavered between recession and inflation, 
muddling through the debt tangle and its domestic 
sequels for most of  the decade. At its close, per 
capita product was still at the 1983 level and real 
national per capita income was 15% lower than 
in 1980. In 1991-1993, however, growth has been 
steadier, there have been signs of  a reanimation 
of  private investment along with the return of 
significant capital flows, the trend towards price 
stabilization has become generalized, and most of 
the huge fiscal adjustments of  the previous years 
have held fast.
Although in some cases stabilization processes still 
display some fragility, most Latin American economies 
are now working on new foundations. These are 
characterized by a firmer orientation towards exports 
(whose volume has, in many cases, at least doubled 
during the past decade), trade liberalization, fiscal 
austerity, more prudent management of monetary 
policy, and greater reluctance to resort to State 
regulation of economic activity.
For the poor and lower-middle income groups, 
the severe economic crisis of  the 1980s involved 
damaging declines both in real income and in access 
to and quality of social services.
Almost all countries experienced acute 
redistributions of income among households during 
the crisis decade, in most cases with regressive net 
outcomes at the end of  the decade. At the same 
time, regressive changes in relative incomes and 
the fall of  real per capita income during the first 
half  of the decade, when most economies suffered 
recessionary adjustments, or had only just begun 
to recover, led to significant increases in absolute 
poverty, which only in a few cases were partially 
reversed with the stabilization and growth processes 
of more recent years.
Economic recovery and the abatement of 
inflation are bringing relief  on the poverty front, 
but there are increasing grounds for suspecting 
that the new modality under which the economies 
are functioning and the new rules of public policy 
involve greater income inequalities and more 
precarious employment situations than in the past, 
in a certainly tighter fiscal environment.
  The author wishes to express his gratitude for the valuable 
comments made by Robert Devlin, Norberto García and Arturo 
León, as well as the expert assistance provided by Gloria Benson 
I
Introduction
and Guillermo Munds, but it goes without saying that they bear 
no responsibility for the final results.
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1. The date base on income distribution and 
poverty
Income distribution statistics in Latin America are 
of varied reliability and are not directly comparable 
with each other.1 Among the many factors distorting 
their comparability, underestimation of  income 
affects differently both income levels and their 
concentration. In order to somehow sidestep this 
obstacle, the analysis of  changes in the relative 
distribution of income is based on pairs of available 
estimates (see table 1), selected for being similar 
–and, therefore, apparently comparable– with 
regard to the concept of income, the technique for 
II
The approach adopted
1 See Altimir (1987) for a review and discussion of the reliability 
of income measurements from different types of surveys in Latin 
TABLE 1
Latin America (10 countries): Changes in income distribution in selected period
Country Period Source Coveragea Income  Changes in  Changes in shares of 
    conceptb concentration (%) income groups
      (% of  total income)
 Gini  Ratio of   Lowest Middle Top
 coefficient top 10% 40% 50% 10%
  to lowest
  40%
Argentina 1970-1974 Altimir (1986) ma hi 4 9 -0.7 -0.7 1.4
 1974-1980 Altimir (1986) ma hpci 10 28 -2.1 -1.2 3.3
 1980-1986 eclac (1991b) ma hpci 11 27 -1.5 -3.2 4.7
 1980-1989 Psacharopoulos
  et al (1992) ma hpci 17 47 -2.9 -3.0 5.9
 1985-1990 Beccaria (1991) ma hpci … 33c  -1.4d  -3.4e 4.8
Brazil 1979-1987 eclac (1991b) ma hpci 4 32 -2.3 -1.3 3.6
   ru hpci 7 9 2.7 -5.5 2.8
 1979-1989 Psacharopoulos
  et al (1992) n hpci 7 28 -1.3 -2.4 3.7
 1987-1989 Hoffman (1992) u ir 8 31f  -2.1g  -2.8h 4.9
 1987-1990 Hoffman (1992) u ir 2 9 -1.0 - 1.0
 1987-1990 eclac (1991b;1993) ma hpci -6 -18 0.4 6.3 -6.7
   ru hpci 1 53 -5.1 5.2 -0.1
Colombia 1978-1988 Londoño (1990) n ir -1 -3 -0.2 0.3 -0.5
 1980-1986 eclac (1991b) ma hpci -3 -12 0.2 0.8 -1.0
   ru hpci -5 … 0.4 3.0 -3.4
 1980-1989 Psacharopoulos
  et al (1992) u hpci -9 -27 1.9 3.2 -5.1
 1986-1990 eclac (1991b;1993) ma hpci -2 -1 -0.4 2.7 -2.3
   ru hpci -9 -2 1.9 1.4 -3.3
Costa Rica 1981-1988 eclac (1991b) ma hpci 7 22 -1.5 -1.6 3.1
   ru hpci 14 3 -1.9 -3.2 5.1
 1981-1989 Psacharopoulos
  et al (1992) n hpci -3 -10 1.4 -1.9 0.5
 1988-1990 eclac (1991b;1993) ma hpci -6 -13 1.1 1.1 -2.2
   ru hpci -6 -15 0.4 3.0 -3.4
(continued)
America and their comparability problems.
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table 1 (concluded)
Country Period Source Coveragea Income  Changes in  Changes in shares of 
    conceptb concentration (%) income groups
      (% of  total income)
 Gini  Ratio of   Lowest Middle Top
 coefficient top 10% 40% 50% 10%
  to lowest
  40%
Chile 1968-1974 Heskia (1980) ma hi -10 -23 2.0 1.8 -3.8
 1974-1980 Heskia (1980), 
  Riveros (1985) ma hi 21 60 -2.8  -6.2h 9.0i
 1981-1983 Riveros (1985) ma hi 2 14 -1.1  -0.5h 1.6i
 1968-1983 eclac (1979), 
  Rodríguez (1985) n hi 23 38 -1.6 -6.2 7.8
 1969-1978 Ffrench-Davis, 
  Raczynski (1987) ma gh … 54j -4.9  -1.6h 6.5i
 1978-1988 Ffrench-Davis, 
  Raczynski (1987) ma gh … 23j -1.9  -1.7h 3.6i
 1987-1990 eclac (1991b; 1991c)  u hpci -2 -3 0.4 -0.4 …
Mexico 1977-1984 eclac (1988), 
  Lustig (1992) n hi -9 -41 2.8 0.7 -3.5
 1984-1989 Lustig (1992)  n hi … 28 -1.4 -3.7 5.1
Panama 1979-1989 Psacharopoulos 
  et al (1992) n hpci 16 66 -3.5 -2.8 6.3
Peru 1985-1986- Psacharopoulos ma hpci 2 5 -0.7 0.5 0.2
 1990 et al (1992)
Uruguay 1973-1979 Melgar(1981),  ma PHI 32 100 -4.7 -8.3 13.0
 1979-1981 Melgar (1981), 
  Melgar-Villalobos
  (1987) ma phi -2 -4 -1.2 6.3 -5.1
 1981-1986 eclac (1991a; 1991b) ma hpci 7 20 -1.2 -2.4 3.6
 1986-1989 eclac (1991a; 1991b) ma hpci -9 -19 1.4 3.1 -4.5
   ru hpci -7 -12 1.5 0.1 -1.6
 1981-1989 Psacharopoulos 
  et al (1992) u hpci -3 -7 0.8 -0.2 -0.6
Venezuela 1981-1986 eclac (1991b) ma hpci 8 19 -2.5 -1.7 4.2
   ru hpci 18 46 -2.6 -3.1 5.7
 1981-1989 Psacharopoulos 
  et al (1992) n hpci 3 8 -0.4 -1.3 1.7
 1986-1990 eclac (1991b; 1993) ma hpci -4 -7 0.8 -0.4 -0.4
   ru hpci … 3 … -0.6 0.6
 1987-1989 Márquez-
  Mukherjee (1991) n hpci 6 11 -0.2 -3.5 3.7
 1989-1990 Márquez-
  Mukherjee (1991) n hpci -4 -14 0.9 1.8 -2.7
a  ma: metropolitan area; ru: remaining urban areas; u: urban 
areas; n: nationwide.
b hi: household income; phi: primary household income; hpci: 
household per capita income; he: household expenditure; 
ir: income of recipient.
c Ratio of top 10% to lowest 30%.
d Corresponds to lowest 30%.
e Corresponds to middle 60%.
f Ratio of top 10% to lowest 50%.
g Corresponds to lowest 50%.
h Corresponds to middle 40%.
i Corresponds to top 20%.
j Ratio of top 20% to lowest 40%.
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TABLE 2
Latin America:a Estimates of poverty and indigence in 1980, 1986 and 1990
 Pobertyb Indigencec
Area 1980 1986 1990 1980 1986 1990
 Millions % Millions % Millions % Millions % Millions % Millions  %
Households
Nationwide 24.2 35 32.1 37 37.0 39 10.4 15 14.6 17 16.9 18
 Urban 11.8 25 18.7 30 22.7 34 4.1 9 7.0 11 8.7 13
 Rural 12.4 54 13.4 53 14.3 53 6.3 28 7.6 30 8.2 30
Persons
Nationwide 135.9 41 170.2 43 195.9 46 62.4 19 81.4 21 93.5 22
 Urban 62.9 30 94.4 36 115.5 39 22.5 11 35.8 14 44.9 15
 Rural 73.0 60 75.8 60 80.4 61 39.9 33 45.6 36 48.6 37
Source: 1980 and 1986: eclac, 1991 to 1990: eclac, 1992a.
a 19 countries. Based on data for: Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, Costa Rica, Guatemala, Mexico, Panama, Peru, Uruguay and Venezuela, 
for 1980 and 1986, and also for Chile, Honduras and Paraguay for 1990.
b Corresponds to household per capita income below poverty lines equivalent to twice the country-specific minimum food budgets, 
which range from 22 to 34 dollars of 1988 per person per month, for urban areas.
c Corresponds to household per capita income below the value of the country-specific minimum food budgets used to draw the poverty 
lines.
2 For a detailed compilation of the income distribution statistics 
available for each country and the selection of comparable pairs, 
sea Altimir (1992). In particular, the manner of selection based 
on the similarity of data and their treatment makes it possible 
to compare Gini coefficients –and calculate their variations, as 
is done in table 1– which have been computed on the basis of 
similarly grouped data.
3 For the method of adjustment applied, see Altimir (1987), and 
for the details of the adjustments see eclac (199la).
measuring income and the geographical coverage of 
the surveys used to collect the data, as well as the 
units and criteria used by the respective authors in 
processing or adjusting the survey data.2 However, 
in many cases proven or assumed differences in any 
of these aspects invalidate the possibility of going 
beyond these pair-wise comparisons and simply 
pooling estimates.
The poverty estimates for the 1980s (table 2) 
are those produced by eclac (1991a and 1992a). 
They are the result of cutting estimated distributions 
of  households by per capita income, previously 
adjusted for income underestimation,3 by means of 
country-specific poverty lines representing minimum 
normative budgets of  private consumption based 
on minimum food budgets that adequately cover 
nutritional requirements.4 The poverty lines used for 
different years of the 1980s were held constant in 
real terms: a criterion that is acceptable for a period 
of recession and recovery.5
The present paper uses only headcount ratios as 
the poverty measure, which are available for several 
years of the past decade, for each country considered.6 
These are given in table 3, which also includes the 
incidence of extreme poverty or destitution, defined as 
the proportion of households with a per capita income 
less than the value of the minimum food budget.
4 See eclac (1991a) for details on these country-specific 
minimum food budgets and how they were set. Minimum food 
baskets were drawn on the basis of  the composition of  food 
consumption of those strata of households that in each country 
attained with some latitude the minimum nutritional requirements, 
although such reference baskets were adjusted to those minima 
as well as to mean national availability of  each foodstuff  and 
were freed of high-price-per-calorie or nutritionally superfluous 
items. Therefore, the criterion to establish the minimum food 
baskets was one based on habits, taking into account availability 
and cost, rather than one of minimum-cost, taking into account 
availability and habits, as used in Altimir (1979) in order to obtain 
estimates for the 1970s.
5 For a discussion of the case for shifting poverty lines during 
periods of economic growth, see Altimir (1991).
6 eclac (1991a) also includes estimates of  the poverty gaps, 
but only for 1986.
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TABLE 3
Latin America (10 countries): Incidence of poverty and indigence in the 1980s
(Percentage of households)
 Poverty Indigence
 Urban areas Rural areas National level Urban areas Rural areas National level
Argentina
 1980 7 16a 9 2 4a 2
 1986 12 17a 13 3 6a 4
 1990 19b 
 1991 15b 
Brasil
 1979 30 62 39 10 35 17
 1987 34 60 40 13 34 18
 1990 39 56 43 17 31 20
Colombia
 1980 36 45a 39 13 22a 16
 1986 36 42 38 15 22 17
 1990 35 12 
Costa Rica
 1981 16 28 22 5 8 6
 1988 21 28 25 6 10 10
 1990 22 25 24 7 12 10
Chile
 1980 32c 41c 33c 
 1987 37 45 38 13 16 14
 1990 34 36 35 11 15 12
Mexico
 1977 32 10
 1984 23 43 30 6 19 10
Panama
 1979 31 45 36 14 27 19
 1986 30 43 34 13 22 16
 1989 34 48 38 15 25 18
Peru
 1979 35 65a 46 10 38a 21
 1985/86 45 64 52 16 39 25
Uruguay
 1981 9 21a 11 2 7a 3
 1986 14 23a 15 3 8a 3
 1989 10 23a 15 2 8a 3
Venezuela
 1981 18 35 22 5 15 7
 1986 25 34 27 8 14 9
 1990 33 38 34 11 17 12
Source: eclac (1991a; 1991b; 1992a).
a These estimates should be considered “educated guesses” based on relevant but indirect information. 
b Author’s estimate, based on Beccaria and Minujin (1991).
c Author’s estimate, based on Pollack and Uthoff (1987). See Altimir (1991).
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These estimates actually build up national 
measures of poverty from urban and rural estimates. 
However, it should be borne in mind that headcount 
estimates for rural areas are of considerably shakier 
quality than those for urban areas. On the one hand, 
the norms used to draw rural poverty lines have an 
unavoidable urban bias, in spite of taking into account 
urban-rural differences in prices and consumption. 
On the other hand, available measurements of rural 
incomes and of their distribution are usually even 
less accurate than those of urban incomes from the 
same survey. Finally, some of the rural estimates are 
no more than educated guesses based on relevant but 
indirect data (Altimir, 1991).
The set of  countries considered in this paper 
includes the major Latin American nations as well 
as some others for which comparable inequality and 
poverty measurements are also available both at the 
beginning of the decade and at some later point in 
time. It excludes predominantly rural countries, such 
as Guatemala and Honduras, for which poverty 
estimates were also produced by eclac, because 
the method of analysis used here and the variables 
on which it rests capture mainly urban phenomena. 
The mere dimensions of  rural poverty according 
to those estimates (affecting four-fifths of the rural 
population and representing at least three-quarters 
of  all the poor) both underline the irrelevance 
of  an urban-centered analysis and suggest that 
poverty measurement and analysis in such cases 
should be based on surveys, poverty yardsticks 
and explanatory variables more closely applicable 
to rural conditions.
In this data base, income generally measures 
household disposable cash income,7 including 
both primary income (wages and salaries and 
entrepreneurial income) and other monetary income 
(pensions, transfers, rentals, interest, etc.) after 
direct tax payments. It therefore excludes imputed 
income from public goods and services provided 
free of charge or heavily subsidized and, hence, the 
redistributive effects of  such public expenditure. 
These income measurements do not capture the 
incidence of indirect taxes on real income, either.
2. The method of analysis
The above caveats should warn us not to confuse the 
map with the actual territory. Although our ultimate 
concern is with changes in social stratification 
and with disentangling those changes that are 
permanently reshaping Latin American societies from 
those related to peoples’ transitory accommodation 
to hard times, we are able here to focus only on 
aggregate changes in the relative distribution of 
welfare and the incidence of  poverty, leaving out 
changes in the composition of  households and in 
their economic strategies, including their ways of 
participating in the labour market.
Moreover, the analysis is limited to changes in 
the distribution of private income, and it excludes the 
distribution of social incomes (that is to say, those 
accruing to households in the form of public goods 
or subsidies), focusing instead on the distributive 
results of  peoples’ participation in the productive 
process and of their institutionalized entitlements. 
This focus leaves in the shadows the immediate 
redistributive consequences of  social policies 
implemented through public expenditure (though 
not the results of  entitlements to social security 
payments) but captures both the short-term effects 
of  economic policy on the distribution of income 
and the more mediate and eventual influences of 
public policy on the structure of income, mingled 
though they may be with structural changes quite 
beyond the influence of policy.
With these limitations, I have tried to assess 
the distributive costs of  the crisis and adjustments, 
which are more than the “social costs” sometimes 
measured as losses in aggregate welfare, but are far 
less than the total social costs, if  we recognize that 
the social structure is more than just the distribution 
of welfare and that living conditions are not only 
determined by income.
Evaluating the specific nature of  the costs is 
another matter. The distributive changes recorded 
by available income distribution measurements 
incorporate the effects of adjustment, institutional 
changes involving policy reform and underlying 
restructuring processes, as well as those of  failed 
adjustment and the acceleration of inflation. However, 
since the crisis of the 1980s is the counterpart of an 
epoch-making transformation of  Latin American 
development, the measured distributive losses are 
attributed to the changes –including the periods of 
instability and inflation, failed policies or policies 
7 Income in kind and imputed income, such as receipts from 
family subsistence activities or rent of owner-occupied dwellings, 
is either explicitly excluded or so poorly measured as to be 
considered excluded in most of  the surveys in the data base, 
which are labour or income surveys. Only a minority of them are 
income and expenditure surveys, which may somehow measure 
such items (sea Altimir, 1987).
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involving overadjustment– that have marked such 
processes in some countries.
The focus is not on the interaction of 
macroeconomic variables (which has been analyzed 
elsewhere),8 but on the relationships between 
changes in income distribution and poverty and 
the processes of  adjustment, policy reform and 
structural mutation underlying the changes in those 
macroeconomic variables.
However, neither the depth nor the characteristics of 
the restructuring of production are adequately revealed 
by changes in the set of macroeconomic variables used, 
and their permanent distributive consequences can 
only hinted at by considering distributive situations 
after stabilization and adjustment.
On the other hand, the association of distributive 
changes with policy reforms poses methodological 
and time-related problems. Economic policy reforms 
generally oriented towards facilitating or promoting 
sustainable growth on the basis of freer trade and 
private investment may have a share in the short-term 
effects on income distribution caused by the package 
of stabilization and adjustment policies through which 
they have been implemented. Moreover, some of 
these effects may have been imposed by the political 
economy of reforms designed to cause such desired 
advances to take root. In the longer term, reforms may 
have negative distributive effects if a trade-off between 
growth and more equitable income distribution is 
observed or is to be expected on the basis of  the 
pattern of growth promoted by the particular reforms 
undertaken. Whether economic restructuring promoted 
by these policy reforms and by the new structural 
circumstances involves more unequal distribution of 
income is a matter whose full empirical verification can 
only take place after the long-term deployment of their 
effects. For the moment, we can only consider what 
appear to be the “normal” or more or less “stable” 
distributive structures once each economy regains a 
sustained growth path.
Even though the distributive costs of external 
adjustment, stabilization, fiscal adjustment and 
economic restructuring are intertwined, the 
characteristics and sequencing of  policy packages 
certainly make a difference in terms of the magnitude 
and duration of distributive losses (see for example 
García, 1991). However, the income distribution and 
poverty estimates in our data base are too scanty to 
give more than very broad hints in this regard.
Moreover, in many instances the periods of 
analysis imposed by the availability of data include 
adjustment or stabilization policies, followed by 
their failure and the acceleration of inflation, thus 
encompassing the distributive costs of  both kinds 
of processes.
The basic assessment criteria I have used in this 
study are, on the one hand, to compare distributive 
changes and changes in macroeconomic and labour 
market variables during similar macroeconomic 
phases in the course of  the adjustment process 
in different countries and, on the other hand, to 
compare the distributive situations before and after 
adjustment in each country.
Consequently, the analysis is carried out for 
different phases of  the macroeconomic evolution 
of each economy during the 1980s, the underlying 
hypothesis being that different relationships between 
distributive changes and macroeconomic changes 
may prevail during instability, recession, recovery 
and growth close to the production frontier. In 
view of the scarcity of distributional measurements 
for each country and the lack of uniformity as to 
their correspondence with similar macroeconomic 
phases, this inhibits us from attempting a formal 
econometric exercise.
In the selection of  macroeconomic variables, 
both their availability and their analytical relevance 
were taken into account. The implicit conceptual 
model links changes in inequality with variations in: 
real national per capita income,9 the real exchange 
rate as a proxy for relative prices, public consumption 
expenditure at constant prices10 as a proxy for 
government employment and real wages, inflation, 
real urban wages and urban labour underutilization 
(i.e.: urban unemployment and informal employment). 
Changes in urban poverty are, in turn, related to 
variations in real per capita income, inequality and 
8 See, for example, Bianchi, Devlin and Ramos (1985; 1987) and 
eclac (1986).
9 That is to say, the per capita product after net factor payments 
and the effect of terms of trade variations; therefore, this variable 
incorporates the direct (i.e.: accounting) effect of external shocks 
represented by changes in the terms of  trade and in accrued 
interest on the foreign debt.
10 That is to say, public consumption expenditure at current 
prices deflated by the gdp deflator. This is different from public 
consumption expenditure in real terms as estimated in the 
national accounts, which in Latin American practice reflects, at 
best, government employment.
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the real minimum wage. Changes in rural poverty, 
on the other hand, are linked to changes in real per 
capita income, agricultural product and the real 
exchange rate.
There are a number of measurement limitations 
that hinder a rigorous association between observed 
changes in income distribution and poverty and 
observed changes in macroeconomic variables. 
Foremost among them is the fact that observed 
income distributions from household surveys of the 
type generally used for these estimates (i.e., those 
including questions on labour) measure incomes in a 
specific month of the year, whereas measures for most 
of the relevant macroeconomic variables are made 
available on a yearly basis, with quarterly data being 
much more difficult to obtain. Moreover, the years for 
which income distribution or poverty measurements 
are readily available do not always correspond to 
relevant phases of the conjunctural movements of the 
economy (which in many cases have been numerous 
and often of different direction) or to periods when 
a specific policy package was in force.
The analysis of associations between distributive 
changes and macro variables focuses on the distribution 
of income and poverty in urban areas, with only a 
summary analysis of  changes in rural poverty. 
There are various reasons for disaggregating the 
analysis. Firstly, as noted above, income distribution 
and poverty measurements at the national level 
incorporate or mix urban and rural measurements 
of very different degrees of reliability or accuracy, 
making the “constant bias over time” assumption 
less tenable. Also, however, most macro variables 
available have a different relationship with either 
urban or rural incomes (e.g.: the exchange rate) or 
a tenuous or remote relationship with rural incomes 
(e.g.: unemployment or informal employment), or 
almost no bearing at all on them in the short run 
(e.g.: urban wages); hence, analysis based on aggregate 
income distribution or poverty at the national level 
blurs their differential explanatory value.
Furthermore, for some countries or periods 
only measurements for urban areas are available. 
To be sure, this is a hindrance for distributional 
analysis. However, it is a less serious problem than 
in other developing regions, since in most of  the 
Latin American countries considered more than 
60% of the population is urban (more than 80% in 
the Southern Cone countries and Venezuela) and 
less than half  the poor are rural (20% or less in the 
Southern Cone and Venezuela).
Finally, the distributive changes of  the 1980s 
are also assessed in the context of  the previous 
trends of  the 1970s (i.e., before the crisis), when 
different growth processes were in place and –in 
some countries– policy reforms were undertaken.
III
The record of the 1970s
1. Inequality
Analysis of  changes in income distribution and 
growth in the main countries of the region during 
the 1970s (Altimir, 1992) suggests, as summarized 
in table 4, that:
i)  Even if  they had very different degrees of 
income concentration at the beginning of the 
decade, countries which experienced disrupted 
growth, such as Argentina, Chile or Peru, 
suffered significant increases in inequality;
ii)  In countries (such as Costa Rica or Uruguay) 
which had moderate average per capita growth 
rates (between 2% and 3%) over the decade and 
in which income concentration, at its beginning, 
was at an intermediate level, there was a 
deterioration in the distribution situation;
iii)  Three countries (Colombia, Mexico and 
Venezuela) which had solid average sustained 
per capita growth rates (over 3% per year), 
significantly reduced their previously high (Gini 
coefficients over 0.5) income concentration;
iv)  In contrast, the high and sustained per capita 
growth rate (close to 6% per year) of  Brazil 
during the 1970s was not accompanied by a 
reduction in the very high income concentration 
(Gini coefficient of  around 0.6) established 
during the previous decade.
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2. Poverty
Changes in the incidence of absolute poverty depend 
on growth of  average real income, changes in the 
distribution of income, and also the stance regarding 
the change in poverty norms over time.11 Using 
comparable estimates of  the incidence of  poverty 
for 1970 and around 1980, with poverty lines both 
constant and shifting oven time (Altimir, 1992), 
the following highlights emerge for the sample of 
countries (see table 4):
i)  Argentina, Chile and Peru, a group of countries 
with increasing inequality and low and unstable 
growth during the decade –as a consequence of 
economic shocks and institutional disruptions– 
registered either discouraging or downright 
dismal results on the poverty front. In Argentina 
the incidence of  poverty at the national level 
may have increased only slightly and in Peru 
it may even have decreased, if  the respective 
“educated guesses” about the decrease in rural 
poverty are accepted, but in both countries 
urban poverty tended to increase. In Chile, 
there was a virtual explosion of poverty in both 
urban and rural areas.
ii)  In the two countries which experienced 
moderate growth and increasing inequality 
(Costa Rica and Uruguay), urban poverty either 
remained unchanged or increased, with rural 
poverty deceasing or remaining about constant, 
respectively.
iii) Those countries which attained high rates of 
per capita growth and decreasing inequality 
(Colombia, Mexico and Venezuela) showed 
significant reductions of absolute poverty, both 
in urban and rural areas.12
iv)  Brazil’s intense growth resulted in the reduction 
of  poverty, even in spite of  the lack of 
improvement of the relative income distribution; 
however, if  some shifting of the poverty line is 
accepted, to allow for the possible effects of 
such a growth process on the prevailing style of 
TABLE 4
Latin America (10 countries): Growth rates and changes in  
income distribution and incidence of poverty in the 1970s
Countries Changes in income  Changes in incidence of  poverty
 concentrationa
 Nationwide Urban Rural
Slow growth (<1%) 
 Argentina i m i d
 Chile i i i i
 Peru i d i d
Moderate growth (2-3%) 
 Costa Rica i d m d
 Panama … m i d
 Uruguay i  i
Rapid growth (>3%) 
 Brazil m d m d
 Colombia d d d d
 Mexico d d d d
 Venezuela d d d d
Source: Altimir (1992).
a i: Increased; M: Maintained similar level; d: Decreased.
11 Contrary to the widespread fashion of  using poverty lines 
constant over time in real terms, there is a strong argument for 
shifting even absolute poverty lines over time, in a context of 
growth and societal progress (sea Altimir, 1991).
12 Even if  the poverty lines were shifted because of  high 
growth, poverty would still have gone down, although to a 
lesser degree.
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living, the incidence of poverty in urban areas 
would have remained more or less constant.
v)  The incidence of poverty in rural areas showed 
a downward trend during the 1970s in almost 
all of the countries considered, irrespective of 
the rate or stability of  their growth, with the 
marked exception of Chile.
vi)  Rural-urban migrations, which were particularly 
intense in the 1970s, may have been more 
important than the improvement of economic 
conditions in rural areas in explaining the 
absolute reduction in the number of rural poor 
in Argentina, Brazil and Venezuela. In contrast, 
the latter factor has been more important than 
migrations in reducing absolute rural poverty 
in Colombia, Mexico and Panama and in 
bringing down the incidence of rural poverty 
in Costa Rica and Peru. In Chile, rural-urban 
migrations merely cushioned the general rise in 
the incidence of poverty.
IV
The 1980s: a review of ten countries
Income concentration and poverty increased in the 
urban areas of almost all Latin American countries 
during the 1980s, as is evident from tables 1 and 
3. Colombia is the only clear exception, while 
Mexico and Costa Rica appear to have cushioned 
to some extent the distributive deterioration caused 
by the adjustments of  the decade, and Panama 
only suffered when it was affected by political and 
international conflicts. Brazil, which already had a 
high degree of  inequality, also suffered relatively 
less additional deterioration. Chile, Argentina 
and Uruguay experienced severe distributive 
losses during different phases of their reform and 
adjustment processes of the last two decades, and 
their record of  the 1980s has to be considered in 
this context. Peru and Venezuela also suffered heavy 
distributive losses, from different combinations of 
shocks and policy failures. The changes in income 
concentration13 and urban poverty in each country 
and period are compared with the changes in 
relevant macroeconomic and labour market variables 
summarized in table 5.
The exceptional case is Colombia, where all 
available data show an improvement of  income 
distribution during the decade: between 1978 and 
1988 there was a relatively slight reduction of income 
concentration among wage-earners (Londoño, 
1990), while between 1980 and 1986 there was a 
significant decrease in the share of the upper decile 
of households, mainly in favour of the middle strata; 
moreover, up to 1990 that improvement deepened, 
favouring also the lower four deciles of households. 
However, the incidence of  urban poverty in 1990 
was roughly similar (around 35%) to the 1980 and 
1986 marks.
These results are roughly consistent with the 
initial conditions before the crisis, the macroeconomic 
trends of the period and the traditionally prudent 
style of  Colombian economic policy. When the 
systemic financial crisis of the 1980s broke, Colombia 
was not heavily indebted; adjustment did not take 
place until 1984-1985, and even then the policy 
followed was a gradual one, deliberately aimed at 
minimizing wage and employment losses. In fact, 
during the rest of  the decade economic policy 
included job creation and sustaining wages among 
its objectives (García, 1991).
In 1986, when the country’s comparatively 
mild external adjustment had just been completed, 
real per capita income was already 5% higher than 
in 1980 and real wages were 12% higher. However, 
urban unemployment was 4 points (i.e.: almost 
a half) higher than in 1980 and 2% more of  the 
13 Even reliable income distribution measurements are not able 
to capture income received by the country’s residents from assets 
held abroad. Capital flight during the initial years of the crisis 
has been substantial, particularly in Argentina, Mexico and 
Venezuela (see Cumby and Levich, 1987). With the yields current 
at the time, property income on assets accumulated abroad by the 
private sector of those countries may have represented around 
3% of household disposable income in Argentina and Mexico 
and as much as 5% in Venezuela. These proportions have most 
likely increased the share of the upper decile or quintile in total 
household income, adding to the changes recorded in table 1 for 
the first half of the decade. Similarly, the later fall in international 
interest rates and related yields should have been reflected in an 
inverse change (of  about half  the size of  the previous one) in 
the “total” (i.e.: from domestic and foreign sources) share of the 
upper-income groups.
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TABLE 5
Latin America (9 countries): Changes in macroeconomic and labour variables
and in income distribution in different phases of the 1980s
Countries Periods Macroeconomic  Labour marketb Changes in income
  variablesa   distributionc
 rnipc reer infd mw rmw unal nali uu gepc Concentration Urban
          (Gini poverty
          coefficient)
I. Periods of  recessionary adjustment to external shocks
 Argentina 1980-1983 -23 77 I -1 37 10 1 81 -19 I? I+?
 Brazil 1979-1983 -13 26 I -18 -5 20 24 8 -7 M I
 Colombia 1980-1983 -5 -12 D 8 7 12 9 21 7 D M?
 Costa Rica 1980-1983 -26 40 I/D -18 -1 12 12 42 -30 I? I+
 Chile 1981-1983 -22 34 I -11 -19 32 5 111 -8 I I
 Mexico 1981-1984e -12 40 I -30 -32 12 7 36 -14 I? I?
 Peru 1982-1984 -12 14 I -25 -20 32 31 35 -22 … I+
 Uruguay 1981-1986 -19 55 I -13 -14 ... ... 60 -14 I I+
 Venezuela 1981-1986 -30 51 … -19 6 24 6 78 -21 I I+
II. Periods of  recovery after external adjustment
 Argentina 1983-1986 … … D 8 7 10 8 19 24 I I?
 Brazil 1983-1987 19 13 D/I 37 -23 -11 -1 -45 42 I D
 Colombia 1983-1986 10 67 I 4 6 4 -2 18 -3 D M
 Costa Rica 1983-1988 8 15 I 8 16 -4 8 -25 11 I? D?
 Chile 1983-1987 12 72 … -3 -27 -25 -16 -37 -23 I …
 Panama 1982-1986 10 …  16 13   26 -3 … M?
 Peru 1984-1987 16 … D/I 40 -3 -15 -7 -46 28 … D?
 Uruguay 1986-1989 13 12 M/I 6 -12 … … -20 -20 D D
 Venezuela 1986-1989 -6 52 I -38 -15 -5 4 -20 -20 I I
III. Periods of  recession due to domestic imbalances
 Argentina 1986-1989 -13 34 I/H -19 -62 14 8 36 ... I I+
 Brazil 1987-1989 -1 -31 I -11 -1 -6 -6 -11 17 I I
 México 1984-1987 -8 44 I -16 -17 21 36 -32 -20 I? …
 Panama 1986-1989 -22 …  -1 -1 … … 61 -22 I? I
 Peru 1987-1990 -30 -49 I/H -69 -64 … … 73 -58 I? I
IV. Periods of  disinflation and recovery
 Argentina 1990-1991 5 -24 D -7 39 … ... -13 … … D
 Mexico 1987-1989 2 -11 D -2 -16 9 14 -7 -10 I? …
V. Periods of  growth after recovery
 Colombia 1986-1990 4 31 I -5 -5 -13 -7 -25 20 D D
 Costa Rica 1988-1990 … -4 D/I 2 5 -4 1 -14 20 D I
 Chile 1987-1990 18 5 I 11 27 -15 1 -45 -3 D D
 Venezuela 1989-1990 10 4 D 1 -5 2 … 8 -9 D …
Source: Changes in macroeconomic and labour variables: eclac and prealc. Distributive changes: tables 1 and 3. 
a rnipc: real national per capita income; reer: real effective exchange rate; inf: inflation.
b rw: real urban or industrial wages; rmw: real minimum wage; nalu: non-agricultural labour force underutilization (per active 
person), equal to nali+uu; nali: Non-agricultural labour force in informal activities (prealc definition); uu: urban unemployment 
rate; gepc: real per capita government consumption expenditure.
c i: increased; i+: greatly increased; d: decreased; m: maintained; “?” indicates most likely presumption for the phase (see text) in the 
context of changes observed in table 1 and 3 for a longer period.
d i: increased; d: decreased; m: inflation rate was maintained; h: entered into hyperinflation. 
e This period includes a transient recovery.
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urban labour force (i.e., 27% of it) was employed 
in informal activities. The 1986/1990 period has 
been one of growth with stability, of sorts, for the 
Colombian economy, though the macroeconomic 
situation deteriorated somewhat in 1990. Real per 
capita income expanded more than 4% over the 
period, with exports, public consumption expenditure 
and private consumption leading the expansion. 
Unemployment correspondingly decreased (by more 
than 3 points) as did the importance of  informal 
employment, while real wages increased slightly up 
to 1989 and decreased significantly only in 1990.
In Mexico, available measurements show a 
significant decrease in inequality, accompanied by a 
reduction of poverty at the national level, between 
1977 and 1984, and a subsequent deterioration 
between 1984 and 1989: a period during which the 
government’s policy stance radically changed (Lustig, 
1992). The 1984 observation falls in the midst of the 
first adjustment and stabilization programme, at 
a time when a moderate economic recovery from 
recessionary adjustment was taking place (Lustig, 
1992). However, real wages had dropped almost 30% 
in two years, and per capita public consumption 
expenditure had decreased 14%. It is likely that the 
improvement in concentration with respect to 1977 
(quite apart from the ever-present possibility that the 
two measurements are not comparable) conceals a 
deterioration from a substantially better distributive 
situation reached during the period of  vigorous 
growth (6% a year) prior to the crisis, particularly 
in urban areas.
Be that as it may, there is evidence of  an 
increase in inequality between 1984 and 1989, when 
the Mexican economy was recovering to a moderate 
rate of  growth with inflation under control, after 
absorbing an oil shock (real per capita national 
income was still 7% lower than in 1984), and in 
a period when fiscal discipline and policy reforms 
were progressively gaining ground. Over this time-
span, per capita public consumption expenditure 
was reduced more than 30% in real terms and 
urban real wages declined a further 26%. At the 
same time, unemployment dropped to levels below 
those registered during the oil boom and informal 
employment increased 10 points, to more than 
30% of  the non-agricultural labour force. Both 
developments, consistent with the remarkable 
flexibility of  real wages, must have cushioned the 
impact on the incomes of  poor and lower-middle 
households (Lustig, 1992).
Costa Rica has been traditionally characterized 
by political and economic stability and the adjustment 
of  its economy during the 1980s was significantly 
aided by official transfers from the United States. 
Nevertheless, the distribution of  urban incomes 
worsened between the beginning and the end of 
the decade, although the improvement of  rural 
incomes may have helped to maintain the previous 
concentration of income at the national level.14 The 
deterioration that took place between 1981 and 1988 
was only partially reversed during the subsequent 
two years, and this reversal favoured the middle 
strata more than the poor. Consequently, urban 
poverty increased significantly between 1981 and 
1988 and also advanced a little more up to 1990.
There is evidence that impoverishment was 
acute during the recessionary external adjustment 
of 1981/1982, while later stabilization and recovery 
in 1983/1986 brought absolute poverty down to 
levels close to those registered prior to the crisis 
(Trejos, 1991). At least, this is what appears to have 
happened at the national level; real devaluation may 
have increased the incomes of  the rural poor, as 
argued by Morley and Alvarez (1992), while the real 
rise of wages in formal activities after the adjustment 
may have improved the situation of  the lower-
middle strata. On the other hand, the deterioration 
of  real incomes in informal activities –which had 
expanded– may have increased the number of the 
urban poor.15
In the subsequent period, marked by policy 
reform (especially trade liberalization) and unstable 
expansion, the available evidence indicates a relative 
stabilization of  the incidence of  poverty at the 
national level (Trejos, 1991; eclac, 1992a), but 
also –as already indicated– a tendency for urban 
poverty to increase, in the context of  a reduction 
of real wages, a gradual decline in real per capita 
income, and relative stability of the real exchange 
rate. On the other hand, the expansion of  public 
14 Morley and Alvarez (1992, tables 7b and 7c) argue that the real 
devaluation that was required for external adjustment presumably 
increased agricultural wages after 1981, although the bulk of the 
devaluation occurred in that year. They also note that between 
1981 and 1989 rural nominal incomes in the lower deciles of 
the national distribution increased more than those of  urban 
households in the same deciles.
15 Morley and Alvarez (1992, table 7h) note that among urban 
households there was a sharp deterioration of  nominal wages 
in non-basic services compared with industry between 1981 
and 1986.
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consumption expenditure in real terms (20% per 
capita) must have helped the observed improvement 
of the relative position of middle income groups.
The external shocks that set off  the crisis in 
other Latin American countries had a delayed and 
milder impact on the economy of Panama, which 
only suffered a brief stagnation of economic activity 
in 1983/1984. In spite of a 23% rise in real per capita 
income and a 14% increase in real wages, between 
1979 and 1986 urban poverty fell only slightly, to 
less than 30% of households. The political crisis cum 
international conflict that pushed the Panamanian 
economy into recession in 1988/1989, however, 
brought real per capita income to 5% below the 1979 
level –although this was not so with real wages–, 
reduced per capita public consumption expenditures 
more than 20% and forced up open unemployment 
of the urban labour force by 10 percentage points. 
As a result, the concentration of income significantly 
increased, as did poverty, which spread to 34% of 
urban households.
The already highly unequal income distribution 
of Brazil, which had not improved even during the 
previous decade of high growth, worsened further 
during the 1980s. The inequality of the distribution 
of  household income remained relatively stable 
during the 1981-1983 recession and later recovery 
and improved slightly and briefly in 1986, in the 
climate of growth and temporary stability created 
by the Cruzado Plan. Between that year and 1989, 
however, with the acceleration of  inflation and 
the beginning of  the present recession, income 
concentration increased, though there is evidence 
(Hoffman, 1992) that in 1990 inequality of household 
income improved somewhat.
Consequently, the distribution of  income in 
1989 was more concentrated than in 1979, and 
poverty affected 5% more of  urban households, 
while real national per capita income and industrial 
wages remained at about the same level as at the 
end of the previous decade, but unemployment had 
risen by more than 3 percentage points, as also had 
informal employment. On the other hand, expansion 
of public consumption expenditure (55% growth in 
per capita terms between 1979 and 1989) must have 
helped to cushion the relative deterioration of the 
middle-income groups. The fall of economic activity 
and incomes in 1990, which was accompanied by a 
20% real reduction of  industrial wages, increased 
urban poverty by 4 additional points, to almost 
39% of households.
External shocks and policy reforms under the 
authoritarian rule of the Pinochet regime, along with 
the ensuing instability and low average growth, caused 
major changes in income distribution and poverty in 
Chile during both the 1970s and the 1980s. Income 
distribution suffered significant deterioration: not 
only was the short-lived redistribution that lasted 
up to 1974 reversed but the distributive pattern of 
Chilean society underwent a complete change.
By 1980, after the recovery from a deep 
recession (per capita gdp was only 6% higher than 
in 1970), the implementation of  a radical trade 
liberalization programme, the reversal of  agrarian 
reform, and institutional reforms that allowed for 
greater labour market flexibility but also for labour 
repression (Ffrench-Davis and Raczynski, 1987), the 
upper decile of  households was receiving at least 
five points more of  total income than in 1968, to 
the detriment of the shares –and real incomes– of 
both the middle and lower strata. Real wages were 
still more than 10% lower than in 1970, 17% of 
the labour force was unemployed and 28% was 
in informal activities. Absolute poverty virtually 
exploded, both in urban areas –from 12% in 1970 to 
around 28% in 1980 and in rural areas, bringing the 
incidence of poverty at the national level to about 
30% of the households (Altimir, 1991).
During the 1982-1983 crisis, the existing 
inequality was further aggravated –although perhaps 
only marginally, compared with the turn around of 
the previous period– and urban poverty increased 
still further.16 The deterioration may have continued 
until 1987, when real per capita income and real 
wages were respectively still 12% and 5% lower than 
in 1980, per capita public consumption expenditure 
had shrunk more than 30%, and unemployment 
still affected 17% of  the labour force, although 
the share of informal activities had been reduced. 
Under those circumstances, urban poverty had risen 
by about 4 points (14% on a per capita basis) and 
the distribution of income had further concentrated 
in favour of  the upper quintile, whose share of 
expenditure increased by almost 4% of  the total 
with respect to 1978, to the detriment of the middle 
and lower strata, the latter having suffered a relative 
greater loss.
16 Pollack and Uthoff  (1987) estimate that absolute poverty 
increased by 8 percentage points (from 40% to 48%) in Greater 
Santiago.
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Only between 1987 and 1990, with the Chilean 
economy reaching full utilization of  its capacity 
and progressive reforms of the labour laws, did the 
distributive picture improve somewhat. Real per 
capita income increased 18%, real wages 11% and 
unemployment was reduced by almost 6 points, to 
about 7% of the labour force. At the same time, urban 
income concentration decreased slightly, in favour 
of the lower income groups, and urban poverty was 
reduced by 2 points, while rural poverty decreased 
more significantly, bringing the incidence of poverty 
at the national level to less than 35% of households.
Major distributive changes have also taken place 
in Argentina since the 1970s, under successive spells 
of  economic instability and political disruption. 
After a military regime came to power in 1976, 
policy reforms were introduced to liberalize prices, 
trade and the financial market, but not employment 
and wages (which were repressed for most of  the 
period). Economic activity followed a stop-go 
pattern in the context of a situation of high inflation, 
in spite of the explicit anti-inflationary policy stance 
which permeated three successive programmes 
(Canitrot, 1981).
Between 1970 and 1980 income concentration 
significantly increased: the upper decile of households 
enlarged its share of total income by almost 5 points, 
while the lower strata lost almost 3 points. Urban 
poverty increased by 2 points, to 7%. Most of this 
deterioration, however, took place after 1974.17 In 
1980, real per capita income was roughly similar 
to the 1974 level and real wages in manufacturing 
were still 14% lower than in that year, though 
unemployment was very low.
The sizeable fluctuations in economic activity, 
the magnitude of the external shocks and ensuing 
adjustments, and swings in relative prices associated 
with high and accelerating inflation during the 
1980s were accompanied by movements of  the 
relative distribution of  income, although these 
were perhaps not as intense as the macroeconomic 
ebb and flow (Beccaria, 1991). By 1986, income 
concentration had further increased with respect 
to 1980, involving a dramatic change from the 
beginning of the 1970s: the share of the upper decile 
had grown about as much as it had in the previous 
decade, but this time at the expense mainly of the 
middle-level strata. Urban poverty had increased 6 
points (i.e., almost doubled), to more than 12% of 
households. Although the economy was recovering 
under a successful stabilization programme, real 
per capita income was 22% below the 1980 level, 
unemployment was 3 points higher, and informal 
employment 2 points higher; on the other hand, 
real wages were 6% higher than at the beginning 
of the decade.
After 1986, the acceleration of  inflation and 
the fall in real wages were accompanied by a further 
deterioration of relative income distribution, which 
reached its high point in 1989; with the burst of 
hyperinflation and recession reaching its trough, 
concentration stood at its peak. In 1990, income 
concentration among individual recipients receded 
to the still high level reached in 1988 (Beccaria, 
1991). Between 1986 and 1990, poverty may have 
spread to an additional 6% of urban households (an 
increase of  more than 50% on a per capita basis) 
and the situation improved only in 1991, when prices 
stabilized and economic recovery began. 
Uruguay is the other Southern Cone country 
in which policy reforms were already undertaken in 
the 1970s, under authoritarian rule, with significant 
distributive consequences. Starting in 1974, the 
financial market was liberalized and price controls 
were gradually eliminated, while wages continued 
to be administered, and as from 1979 a trade 
liberalization programme was put into effect. 
The 1973-81 period was one of  relatively high 
growth (3.4% per capita a year); nevertheless, the 
distribution of income deteriorated sharply between 
1973 and 1979 –at the expense of both the middle 
and lower strata– improving somewhat later, but 
only to the benefit of the middle income strata. This 
evolution closely followed that of  the relationship 
between real national per capita income and real 
wages: the former increased 12% between 1973 and 
1979, while the latter dropped 32%, and between 
1979 and 1981 real income expanded 4% but real 
wages rose about 17%. On the other hand, urban 
poverty increased by 4 percentage points (40% on a 
per capita basis) between 1970 and 1981.
External shocks and ensuing adjustments slashed 
real per capita income by 19% between 1981 and 
1986; real wages fell 8% and unemployment increased 
4 points, while per capita public consumption 
expenditure was reduced more than 30%. Income 
concentration increased yet again, and urban poverty 
expanded by 5 additional percentage points, to 14% 
17 See Altimir (1986) for the evolution of  income distribution 
and Beccaria and Minujin (1991) for the evolution of absolute 
poverty during the period.
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of  households. As a result of  economic recovery 
and later stagflation, real per capita income in 1989 
was 13% higher than in 1986 and real wages were 
6% higher, while unemployment had decreased 2 
percentage points. Consequently, the distribution 
of  urban incomes: improved and urban poverty 
decreased by 4 percentage points. Thus, at the end 
of  the decade, the relative distribution of  income 
and the incidence of absolute poverty were roughly 
similar to those at its outset, while real wages were 
substantially lower and unemployment somewhat 
higher than in 1981.
Continuing deterioration of  real national 
income in Venezuela between 1980 and 1986, caused 
by the fall in oil revenues, and the ensuing reduction 
(around 20%) of real wages and per capita public 
consumption expenditure were accompanied by a 
significant worsening of  the distributive situation. 
Between 1981 and 1986 urban poverty increased 
7 percentage points (almost 40% on a per capita 
basis) while the relative distribution of income also 
became more unequal.
Economic policy failed to adjust to the fall in 
oil prices in 1986; external and fiscal imbalances 
widened and the rate of  inflation trebled. The 
orthodox stabilization programme implemented at 
the beginning of  1989, along with the first trade 
and price liberalization measures of a programme 
of policy reform, brought a recession and sharp falls 
in public consumption expenditure and real wages, 
while previous gains in employment were reversed and 
informal activities expanded. Consequently, poverty 
increased18 and income distribution apparently 
“equalized downwards”. The rise in oil earnings 
caused by the Persian Gulf  conflict in 1990, and 
ensuing public expenditure in 1991, fuelled an 
extraordinary –and unsustainable– expansion of 
economic activity. This, however, was mainly to 
the advantage of  the upper-middle strata; urban 
poverty in 1990 was still 9 percentage points higher 
than in 1986 and 16 points higher than in 1981 (i.e., 
almost double). On the other hand, there is evidence 
indicating that by 1991 –at least at the national 
level– poverty may have receded somewhat.19
The worsening income distribution in the urban 
areas of  Peru in the 1970s was aggravated during 
the 1982/1985 crisis and external adjustment, in a 
climate of increasing violence. By the end of 1985 
and the beginning of 1986, when the economy was 
recovering under the drive of  an unsustainable 
heterodox stabilization programme implemented by 
the newly elected García government, real national 
per capita income and real wages in the private 
sector were still 9% and 5% lower than in 1979, 
while an additional 10% of  the non-agricultural 
labour force was employed in informal activities 
(thus reaching more than 40%). At that time, urban 
poverty still affected 45% of urban households: 10 
percentage points more than in 1979.
Although there are no comparable observations 
for later years, there is some evidence that by 1990, 
in the midst of hyperinflation and economic collapse, 
poverty may have expanded by more than half  with 
respect to 1985/1986, and it worsened still further in 
1991, when the Fujimori government put into effect 
the present stabilization programme.20
18 Marquez (1992) estimates that, at the national level, poverty 
affected 28% of  households in 1985, 32% in 1987 and 41% 
in 1989.
19 Marquez (1992) puts the incidence of poverty at the national 
level in 1991 at 35% of households, compared with 41% in 1989, 
a point when it was no doubt higher than in 1990.
20 See Figueroa (1992, table 2) and Abugattas and Lee (1991, table 
4). On the other hand, comparison of the distribution of Lima 
households by size of per capita consumption expenditure, on the 
basis of the 1985/1986 and 1990 surveys of the standard of living 
(Psacharopoulos et al., 1992), shows little increase in inequality 
between the two observations; this may reflect another case of 
“downward equalization” by recession, with the real consumption 
of the poor falling by almost 7% a year and the real consumption 
of the richest decile by almost 6% a year.
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For most of  the countries in our sample there is 
evidence of a decrease –however slight in some cases– 
of the incidence of rural poverty in the course of the 
1980s, thus somehow at least inertially continuing 
the trend towards abatement of rural poverty that 
was manifest in the previous decade. The only clear 
exceptions are Panama and Venezuela, where that 
trend appears to have reversed by the end of  the 
1980s, and possibly Argentina, for which a slight 
increase of rural poverty has been estimated. Chile 
is a special case, since the rural impoverishment of 
the 1970s continued well into the following decade, 
only to be reversed in the latter years (table 3).
Those exceptional increases are associated 
with falls in real per capita income, but the reverse 
does not hold true: of  nine recorded spells of 
rural poverty reduction, this coincided with an 
increase in real national per capita income in only 
four cases;21 in the remaining five rural poverty 
decreased along with declines in real national 
income. In contrast, there is a close association of 
rural poverty reduction with expanding agricultural 
output, which holds good in eight of the nine cases, 
suggesting that peasants somehow share in general 
rural prosperity. In contradiction to conventional 




Latin America (8 countries): Changes in rural poverty and in  
relevant macroeconomic variables in the 1980s
(Percentage change over each period)
Country Period Changes in rural  Changes in macroeconomic variables
  povertya  (per cent)
  (per cent)
 Per capita real  Agricultural  Real 
 national income gdp exchange rate
Argentina 1980-1986 4 -23 12 75
Brazil 1979-1987 -3 4 41 43
 1987-1990 -6 -7 – -38
Colombia 1980-1986 -7 5 11 47
Costa Rica 1981-1988 -3 -5 18 -6
 1988-1990 -10 – 10 -4
Chile 1980-1987 11 -13 33 89
 1987-1990 -19 18 14 5
Panama 1979-1986 -4 23 11 –
 1986-1989 11 -22 7 –
Peru 1979- -2 -9 12 -9
 1985-1986
Venezuela 1981-1986 -3 -30 23 51
 1986-1990 12 3b 1 59
Source: eclac.
a  Taken from estimates in table 3. 
b  1986-1989: -6%.
21 Brazil (1979-1987), Colombia (1980-1986), Chile (1987-1990) 
and Panama (1979-1986).
22 At least, this is true if  no allowance is made for time lags 
between real devaluation, reallocation of resources to tradeables, 
ensuing expansion of  agricultural output, and eventual 
participation of peasants and labourers in such expansion.
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real devaluation of  the exchange rate, since it is 
observed in only four of the cases, and in most of 
them with low parameters (table 6).
All this suggests that, in the absence of major 
institutional reform,23 slow-moving structural 
changes in the rural milieu affect the process of 
reduction of rural poverty more than short or even 
medium-term changes in macroeconomic variables, 
although these may be able to slow down or even 
temporarily reverse such a process.
These slow-moving changes are in part reflected 
in the continuous transfer of  rural poverty to the 
urban areas through migrations. In the 1980s, these 
have been less intense than in the previous decade, 
but they were nevertheless substantial. In most of 
the countries, rural-urban migrations were the main 
force sustaining the trend towards the reduction of 
poverty in rural areas, although they may not have 
been sufficient –as they had been in the 1970s– to 
prevent an absolute increase in the rural poor.
VI
Transient and permanent changes
in income distribution
In order to shed some light on whether and to what 
extent changes in inequality during the decade of 
crisis and adjustments may be permanent, it is 
crucial to consider the different macroeconomic 
phases through which the Latin American countries 
have passed and the structural circumstances 
in which each of  them is situated at present, as 
well as the nature and depth of  policy reforms 
undertaken. Changes in macroeconomic and labour 
variables and distributive changes in selected periods 
corresponding to different macroeconomic phases of 
the 1980s are summarized in table 5.24
1. Income distribution and poverty in different 
phases of adjustment processes
Recessive adjustment to external shocks at the 
beginning of the decade has had adverse effects on 
inequality and devastating effects on urban poverty 
all over Latin America. Income concentration 
certainly increased in Argentina, Chile, Uruguay 
and Venezuela and perhaps also in Costa Rica 
and Mexico, while in Brazil inequality apparently 
remained unchanged through the rapid adjustment of 
1981-1984 (Hoffman, 1992). In all these cases urban 
poverty increased during the adjustment, along with 
underutilization of the urban labour force25 (which 
rose by between 10% and 20%, depending on the 
country) and there were sizeable falls in real per 
capita income, real average wages26 and real per 
capita public consumption expenditure.
Colombia stands out as an exception, partly 
because of its lesser initial debt burden. The economy 
went through a smooth external adjustment –even 
with real currency appreciation– with reduction of 
inflation, which allowed for real rises in minimum 
and average wages, and even for the real expansion 
of  per capita consumption expenditure. Such was 
the background for the probable improvement of 
income distribution and the lack of aggravation of 
absolute poverty. Although Panama also underwent 
a mild adjustment in 1982-1984, with rising real 
wages but an increase in unemployment, in this case 
there is no indication of  the distributive changes 
over that period.
23 Such as agrarian reform, as in Peru, or its reversal, as in Chile, 
both in the 1970s.
24 The intervals between measurements of poverty (table 3) or 
income distribution (table 1) usually cover more than one phase 
of economic evolution; in these cases, the changes in distribution 
shown in the table are also based on the evidence referred to in 
the text.
25 The indicator of underutilization of the urban labour force 
used here is the sum of the rate of open (urban) unemployment 
and the proportion of the non-agricultural labour force engaged 
in informal activities, estimated by prealc.
26 In Argentina, however, real wages recovered and the minimum 
wage increased sharply in 1983, at the end of the disintegrating 
military regime, even with accelerating inflation. In Chile, real 
average wages (in formal activities) rose up to 1982, in a context 
of moderate inflation, high labour underutilization (almost half  
of the non-agricultural labour force) and a new labour regime 
that gave the labour market total flexibility (García, 1991).
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The recovery after external adjustment only 
brought relief  on the poverty front in certain 
countries. In Brazil, it may be associated with the 
cumulative rise in real per capita income (close to 
20%) and real wages (37%), and with decreasing 
labour underutilization, in spite of  a probable 
increase in inequality.27 If  Peru also experienced a 
slackening of urban poverty during this phase –which 
is not known for certain, but is likely– this may have 
been due to a similar configuration of changes in the 
level of activity and the labour market. The decrease 
of poverty in Uruguay –along with inequality– and 
perhaps in Costa Rica and Panama, and the possible 
maintenance of  its already limited incidence in 
Colombia, are also associated with changes in income 
and the labour variables in the same direction but to 
a less spectacular extent.28
In contrast, recovery in Argentina, Chile and 
Venezuela was accompanied by further increases in 
urban poverty, although for different reasons. In 
Argentina, the unsteady and only partial recovery 
and the increase in unemployment and informal 
labour apparently outweighed the modest rise in real 
wages and the temporary abatement of inflation. In 
Venezuela, too, until 1989, the recovery had been 
partial and subject to adverse external shocks, with 
accelerating inflation, while shrinking (-38%) real 
wages and per capita consumption expenditure 
(-20% in real terms) outweighed the very modest 
decrease in labour underutilization, providing the 
background for increases in inequality and urban 
poverty. In the case of Chile, complete labour market 
flexibility allowed for a deterioration in equity in the 
medium-run; the 1983-1987 recovery was vigorous 
and underutilization of the labour force decreased 
significantly (although it still remained at more than 
a third of the urban labour force), but real wages 
and per capita public consumption expenditure 
barely held steady, in a context of  moderate and 
roughly constant inflation, while both inequality 
and absolute poverty increased.
Those countries which again plunged into 
recession, after recovering from external adjustment, 
due to pervasive internal imbalances, additional 
external shocks and accelerating inflation combined 
with stabilization efforts, experienced further 
increases in inequality and absolute poverty.
In Argentina and Peru such imbalances drove 
the economies to hyperinflation, and in Brazil to 
the brink of  it; real incomes and wages plunged 
and labour underutilization increased, as also did 
absolute poverty and income inequality. Argentina’s 
emergence from hyperinflation in 1990 stopped the 
fall and even brought some marginal improvement 
in inequality, although it did not prevent a further 
increase in poverty. The acceleration of  inflation 
in Brazil took place along with some economic 
expansion and further increases in per capita public 
consumption expenditure, albeit with stagnating 
real per capita income and falling real wages; 
however, the 1990 stabilization package brought 
about disinflation with recession, which apparently 
increased poverty still further.
External shocks in 1985-1986 and stabilization 
efforts in Mexico also led to a new recessionary spell; 
the increase in informal activities and the drop in 
real wages suggest that there may have been a further 
increase in urban poverty and that –jointly with the 
fall in per capita public consumption expenditure– 
part of  the observed increase in inequality up to 
1989 may have taken place during this period. 
Panama’s deep recession of 1988-1989, triggered by 
political and international conflicts, increased urban 
poverty and possibly also inequality.
The two cases of stabilization and recovery from 
high inflation and recession in the late 1980s (Argentina 
in 1990-1991 and Mexico in 1987-1989) included 
moderate increases in real income and in the utilization 
of the urban labour force and also moderate reductions 
in real wages. In the case of Argentina, urban poverty 
decreased from the high level of incidence attained 
during the previous spells. In the case of  Mexico, 
however, there is no evidence of a similar abatement 
of poverty or of a decrease in inequality.
In almost all of  the few observable instances 
of  sustained or even unsustainable growth after 
recovery, such circumstances brought about an 
improvement of  the relative income distribution 
and some decrease in urban poverty. Only in Costa 
Rica in 1990 was there a rise in urban poverty, with 
the acceleration of  inflation and particularly the 
elimination of subsidies and the increase in public 
service rates. In both Colombia and Chile inequality 
and poverty decreased; in the latter case the rises in 
27 However, the conspicuous increase in real per capita public 
consumption expenditure (42%) must have improved the relative 
position of some middle-income strata.
28 Mexico’s brief  and mild recovery in 1984 did not significantly 
alter the results of the previous recessive phase, although “the 
very circumstances that triggered it contributed in part to its 
demise” along with worsening terms of  trade in 1985 (Lustig, 
1992, pp. 34-36).
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real incomes and wages were more substantial, but in 
Colombia there was an expansion in real per capita 
public consumption expenditure. In Venezuela, 
there are indications of  a reduction of  income 
concentration in 1989-1990, in spite of falling real 
wages and increasing unemployment.
2. Permanent changes in income concentration
Let us consider first the countries that have already 
attained a stage of full-capacity growth. Colombia 
is the only one in which income concentration at 
that stage is actually lower than before the crisis, 
but in Costa Rica in 1990 urban inequality was 
only slightly higher than in 1981. In both countries, 
real wages and per capita public consumption 
expenditure were higher than at the beginning of 
the decade (table 7).
In Chile, in contrast, after regaining a medium-
term growth path, the income structure is significantly 
TABLE 7
Latin america (10 countries): inequality, urban poverty and macroeconomic
variables at the end of the 1980s, relative to pre-crisis levels
(Indices)
Country Year Base year Macro  Application  Inequality Urban  gdp rnipcb rgcpcc nalfd rwe rmwf  reerg
   phasea of  significant (Gini poverty
    policy reforms coefficient) (incidence)
Argentina 1990 (1980=100) d&r Recent 113 205 93 69 ... 88 77 40 185
Brazil 1990 (1979=100) rddi Partial 108 130 127 97 158 98 85 55 89
Colombia 1990 (1980=100) sgar Partial 91 96 135 110 125 99 106 108 192
Costa Rica 1990 (1981=100) sgar Yes 103 138 128 95 115 103 102 134 90
Chile 1990 (1981=100) sgar Yes 113 107 126 104 69 108 96 76 240
Mexico 1989 (1977=100) d&r Yes 100? >95 147 106 76 89 54 41 111
Panama 1989 (1979=100) rddi No 116 111 116 95 99 ... 108 93 
Peru 1990 (1979=100) rddi Recent ... 190 94 72 62 ... 36 24 40
Uruguay 1989 (1981=100) raea Yes 98 109 100 92 86 ... 93 76 173
Venezuela 1990 (1981=100) ug Recent 110 188 105 72 68 93 48 63 240
more concentrated than before the crisis and certainly 
much more than the relative income distribution 
prevalent at the end of the 1960s, before the socialist-
populist experiment and the authoritarian structural 
reforms of the 1970s (see table 1). This, in spite of 
an almost recovered real wage. Also in Venezuela, 
income concentration is higher than before the crisis, 
after recovery evolved into rapid albeit unsustainable 
growth; in this case, both real wages and per capita 
public consumption are substantially lower than 
before the crisis.
Although they were not yet on a full-capacity 
growth path in 1989, Mexico and Uruguay were 
approaching the culmination of  their respective 
recoveries; at that stage, income inequality had 
nearly returned in both cases to pre-recession 
levels.29 In Mexico, this occurred in spite of drastic 
reductions of  real wages and public consumption 
expenditure, whereas in Uruguay both variables were 
more moderately eroded.
a d&r: Disinflation and recovery; rddi: Recession due to 
domestic imbalances; sgar: Sustained growth after recovery; 
raea: Recovery after external adjustment; ug: Unstable 
growth.
b rnipc: Per capita real national income.
c rgcpc: Per capita real government consumption expenditure. 
d  nalf: Index of  the proportion of  the non-agricultural 
labour force employed in formal activities (opposite of nalu 
(under-utilization of non-agricultural labour force per active 
person)). 
e rw: Real urban or industrial wages. 
f rmw: Real minimum wage.
g reer: Real effective exchange rate.
29 However, if  pre-recession (i.e., around 1981) inequality in 
Mexico was even lower than the level observed in 1977, as 
suggested earlier, post-recovery inequality would have been 
somewhat higher than that previous mark.
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The countries that were still labouring under 
recession and instability at the end of  the 1980s 
(Argentina, Brazil, Panama and Peru) showed 
degrees of inequality substantially higher than those 
prevailing before the crisis. Stabilization and recovery 
in Argentina only brought some improvement of 
income inequality, but this nevertheless remained 
high compared with the pre-crisis level, which was 
substantially higher than that prevailing before the 
disruptions of the 1970s. On the other hand, in the 
spells of recovery after external adjustment, income 
distribution improvements –where they existed– only 
took place along with real wage increases, as outlined 
above; these are less likely during the stabilization 
processes still faced by Brazil and Peru and have not 
occurred during the current Panamanian recovery.
Consequently, one should not expect significant 
equity improvements in these countries as a 
consequence of stabilization and recovery. Indeed, 
full deployment of  policy reforms and associated 
adjustment measures –particularly on the fiscal 
front– may still bring a medium-term increase in 
income inequality. Furthermore, if  the experiences 
of Colombia and Chile are taken as examples, all 
these, countries can only expect a modest reduction 
of  income inequalities later, when they attain a 
sustained growth path.
In sum, “normal” distributive patterns in 
the coming phase of  sustained growth, when this 
materializes in most Latin American countries, once 
they have recovered from the crisis and its sequels, 
completed structural adjustments, and deployed 
policy reforms, tend to be more unequal –at least 
in the urban areas– than those prevailing in the 
last stages of  the previous growth phase, during 
the 1970s.
Only Colombia, Costa Rica and Uruguay 
–and, just possibly, Mexico– have managed to 
restore their previous degrees of  inequality (table 
7). It is no accident that this should have happened 
in countries in which social justice values have 
traditionally imbued institutions, objectives of equity 
have been quite consistently incorporated in policy 
design throughout the adjustment phase, and both 
adjustment and policy reforms have been approached 
gradually and pragmatically.30 This suggests that 
the tendencies that increase inequality of  primary 
earnings (before the eventual corrections involved in 
public social spending) can be positively corrected by 
economic policy design and implementation.
VII
Prospects for poverty alleviation
Even without any significant changes in the relative 
distribution of  income,31 absolute poverty will be 
reduced by economic growth; and this will take place 
more quickly –at least in economists’ estimates– if  
constant poverty lines are used, or more sluggishly 
if shifting poverty yardsticks are deemed normatively 
more appropriate.
The record of the 1970s, outlined earlier, shows 
urban poverty decreasing only in rapidly growing 
economies which either maintained or reduced their 
concentration of household income. In Colombia, 
Mexico and Venezuela, where equity improved, the 
reduction of  urban poverty showed elasticities of 
-0.5 to -1 with respect to the increase in real per capita 
income and of -0.4 to -2 with respect to real wages. 
In Brazil, where there was no significant improvement 
in income concentration, such elasticities were much 
lower (table 8).
Recession and recovery in the 1980s left 
most Latin American countries with a sometimes 
markedly higher incidence of poverty in urban areas 
than before the crisis. Only Colombia and possibly 
Mexico were able to end their respective recovery 
phases with less urban poverty than before the 
recession, in both cases because of  a decrease in 
inequality (table 7). 
Available poverty estimates seldom permit a 
sharp differentiation between periods of recession 
30 The gradual approach has been abandoned in Mexico in 
the last phase of  the reform process, but it must be borne in 
mind that this phase has coincided with the preparations for 
the incorporation of the country into the North American Free 
Trade Agreement (nafta), a strategic leap forward which, when 
fulfilled, will radically change the structural conditions of  the 
Mexican economy and, among them, its distributive structures.
31 Including, to be sure, the absence of  changes in either 
the composition of  households and their work and resource 
utilization strategies, which is a highly artificial assumption.
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and those of recovery. When they do, the beneficial 
effects of recovery on poverty appear weaker than 
the negative effects of  the previous recession. In 
Uruguay, the elasticity of  poverty with respect to 
real income in the 1986-1989 recovery was -2, while 
during the recession it had been -3. In Argentina, 
disinflation plus recovery abated poverty as elastically 
(-4) as recession had increased it, but the recovery 
itself  was then very incipient. In Venezuela, on the 
other hand, the completion of  recovery did not 
prevent poverty from widening still further.
In other instances (Brazil 1979-1987, Costa Rica 
1981-1988, Chile 1980-1987 and Peru 1979-1986) the 
culmination of the recovery phase left the economy 
with a greater degree of  inequality and a higher 
incidence of urban poverty. In Costa Rica, not even 
sustained growth after 1988 was able to prevent the 
increase in urban poverty, as a consequence of price 
deregulation (table 8).
In most cases, real wages at the end of  the 
recovery process were lower than before the crisis, 
which helps to explain the weaker effect of recovery 
TABLE 8
Latin America: Changes in urban poverty and their relation with changes 
in income concentration and real income in different periods
Country Period Changes in income  Percentage variation Elasticity of urban poverty
  concentrationa  in relation to:
 Urban  rnipcb rwc rmwd rnie rw rmw
 population
1. Growth periods in the 1970s
 Brazil 1970-1979 M -14 67 48 -1 -0.2 -0.3 14
 Colombia 1970-1980 D -21 44 17 27 -0.5 -1.2 -0.8
 Mexico 1970-1984 D -30 31 15 -20 -1.0 -2.0 1.15
 Venezuela 1970-1981 D -30 71  -3 -0.4 -0.4 10
II. Periods of  recession and recovery in the 1980s
 Argentina 1980-1986 I 71 -23 7 47 -3.1 10 1.5
  1986-1990 I 52 -15 -22 -64 -4.0 -2.4 -0.8
  1990-1991 ... -22 5 -7 39 -4.4 3.1 -0.6
 Brazil 1979-1987 I 13 3 19 -27 4.2 0.7 -0.5
  1987-1990 I 15 -6 -29 -26 -2.5 -0.5 -0.6
 Colombia 1980-1986 D – 5 12 13 – -0.1 –
 Costa Rica 1981-1988 I 31 -5 16 27 -6.5 1.9 1.1
 Chile 1980-1987 I 14 -13 -5 -31 -1.1 -2.8 -0.5
 Mexico 1977-1984 D -6 14 -34 -40 -0.4 -0.2 0.2
 Panama 1979-1986 I -3 23 14 -6 -0.1 -0.2 0.5
  1986-1989 ... 13 -22 -1 -1 -0.6 -13 -13
 Peru 1979-1986 ... 29 -7 -5 -39 -4.1 -5.8 -0.7
 Uruguay 1981-1986 I 56 -19 -13 -14 -3.0 -4.3 -4.0
  1986-1989 D -29 13 6 -12 -2.1 -4.8 2.4
 Venezuela 1981-1986 I 39 -31 -19 6 -1.3 -2.1 6.5
  1986-1990 D 32 3 -41 -19 9.4 -0.8 -1.7
III. Growth periods in the late 1980s
 Colombia 1986-1990 D -3 4 -5 -5 -0.7 0.6 0.6
 Costa Rica 1988-1990 D 5 -2 2 5 -2.8 2.5 1.0
 Chile 1987-1990 D -8 18 11 27 -0.4 -0.7 -03
Source: Table 5.
a  m: Maintained similar level; d: Decreased; i: Increased. 
b rnipc: Per capita real national income.
c rw: Real urban or industrial wages. 
d Real minimum wage.
e Real national income.
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on poverty. Although in Argentina and Brazil, at the 
culmination of the respective heterodox stabilization 
programmes, and in Costa Rica real wages were 
higher, that fact appears to have been offset by other 
factors which increased inequality and, particularly 
in the first case, by the fall of real per capita income. 
In Colombia and Panama, in contrast, higher real 
wages have reinforced the effect of  the recovery 
of real income in preventing an increase in urban 
poverty. This was not so, however, in Mexico, where 
real wages in 1984 were substantially lower than 
before the crisis (table 8).
On the other hand, the few observable growth 
spells at the end of the 1980s (Colombia 1986-1990 
and Chile 1987-1990) show elasticities with respect 
to real per capita income (-0.7 and -0.4, respectively) 
similar to those recorded in the 1970s in rapidly 
growing economies where income inequality was 
decreasing. Only in Chile, however, has poverty 
reduction been more elastic with respect to real 
wages than to real incomes, as had happened in all 
cases in the 1970s (table 8).
Rural-urban migrations will continue to exert 
pressure on the ability of the economies to alleviate 
urban poverty. If  the experience of  the last two 
decades (Altimir, 1991) is any indication of  what 
might happen, in the relatively less urbanized 
countries with a high incidence of  poverty in the 
rural areas, the migrating rural poor may swell the 
ranks of the urban poor at a rate equivalent to an 
absolute increase of 1.3-2.0 % a year.
To sum up all this evidence, it is likely, on 
the one hand, that countries accomplishing their 
recovery into full-capacity growth will undergo a 
change in their ability to reduce urban poverty in 
the short run, requiring relatively more expansion of 
economic activity than in the recovery phase for each 
percentage point of poverty reduction. On the other 
hand, medium-term growth with no improvement of 
income inequality would permit only a slow process 
of poverty abatement: slower than in the cases of high 
growth and equity improvement of the 1970s, and 
slower than during recent growth spells in Colombia 
and Chile, when income distribution also improved.
VIII
Conclusions
After overcoming the difficult period of the 1980s, 
Latin American countries are entering into a new 
era of potential growth under a different pattern of 
development and a new style of State intervention. 
The adjustments to absorb both exogenous changes, 
those required in order to adapt to resource 
availability and utilization, and the structural changes 
still under way have caused most Latin American 
societies to suffer more unequal distribution of 
income and a higher incidence of  poverty among 
their people. The few exceptions are the result 
of  deliberate and persistent concern for equity 
in economic policy design and implementation. 
Moreover, the prospects for poverty alleviation 
through growth alone, without improvement of the 
relative distribution of incomes and vigorous social 
policies, appear so limited as to be disheartening 
and seem likely to be counterproductive for social 
integration and, ultimately, for sustained growth 
(eclac, 1990).
Given the unlikely prospect that primary 
earnings will become less unequal, even if  there 
is deliberate concern for this in economic policy, 
the improvement of  equity and particularly the 
abatement of  absolute poverty will have to lean 
much more on social policy and its effectiveness. 
With fiscal resources reduced or still constrained 
by the debt burden, however, the scope for welfare 
transfers will be restricted to no more than the 
provision of a basic social safety net, with preference 
being given to social expenditures that can be 
considered as investment in human resources.
Eventual gains in equity of income distribution 
will  depend on the spread of  productivity 
improvements and their actual appropriation 
by households. The structural transformations 
underway tend to increase the productivity of capital 
and total factor productivity, thus enhancing labour 
productivity in the economy at large. However, for 
income distribution to improve on the basis of 
differential productivity gains three developments 
are required. First, employment in formal or modern 
activities must be extended, along with productivity 
increases, to a larger proportion of the labour force, 
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thus absorbing underemployment. Second, those 
productivity increases must be effectively translated 
into proportional wage rises. Third, the capital 
per worker in the labour force remaining in the 
informal, small business and traditional sectors of 
the economy must increase dramatically.32
In order to attain these objectives it is necessary, 
as well as raising the productivity of  capital in 
general, to increase the skills of  the different 
segments of  the labour force, while at the same 
time restructuring the availability of  skills so as 
to enhance the technological capabilities of  the 
productive system at large. For this purpose, and in 
order to ensure long-term progress, heavy investment 
in human resources (education, training and 
retraining, nutrition and health) must supplement 
investment in fixed capital (eclac, 1992b). Indeed, 
there are some grounds for substituting investment 
in human capital for investment in physical capital, 
in so far as a greater contribution to total factor 
productivity can be expected from the former, in a 
long enough term.
Fulfilling these requirements involves substantial 
amounts of investment resources, partly originated 
and handled in the marketplace, but also partly 
raised and allocated by the State. At the same time, 
in order for higher skills to be reflected in workers’ 
income, pay structures must meet the double 
challenge of being at the same time institutionalized 
and flexible.
The efficient absorption of  capital by the 
underemployed, effective widespread access to the 
acquisition of skills and their efficient application 
to production, and correspondence between 
contributions to productivity and earnings all call 
for substantial organizational improvements at the 
company level and profound institutional reforms 
in public policy.
Abating structural poverty follows the same 
lines as general improvements in income distribution 
but poses different obstacles that must be overcome 
if  policies are to be effective. On the one hand, 
the physical capital required may be lower than 
in modern activities, but the skills gap is greater. 
On the other hand, effective public policies are 
more demanding in terms of  organizational 
requirements and institutional creativity. Finally, 
the remedies must address the whole vicious circle 
of circumstances that reproduce poverty from one 
generation to another.
Strategies for equity improvement must take 
these differences into account. The usual way in 
which social policy is designed –which actually 
restricts access mainly to the strata above the 
poverty line, for which such policies may be more 
easily implemented, and thus leaves the poor to fend 
for themselves– may lead to further progress for a 
segment which is already integrated into society and 
actually endorse the disintegration of  the poorer 
strata into a segregated underclass. At the other 
extreme, a unilateral strategy focusing only on 
the poor may further weaken the low and middle 
strata of the population, where a rich reservoir of 
skills, social cohesion and political dynamism is 
located. What is required is a “two-tier” strategy 
that recognizes the differences between the poor 
and the non-poor working population in terms of 
potential, response and deterioration of life styles 
and aims at integrating both universes into a single 
dynamic society.
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